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SEEING THE WOOD DESPITE THE TREES? ON THE SCOPE OF UNION 
CITIZENSHIP AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS
ELEANOR SPAVENTA*
1. Introduction
The body of case law on Union citizenship has grown considerably in the past 
ten years, giving us a varied and complex picture of citizens’ rights. Overall, 
Union citizens knocking at the Court’s door have found a friendly welcome 
and, in most cases, they have also been granted what they asked for. However, 
the variety of factual situations which gave rise to the cases, together with the 
Court’s reasoning, often complex and not always clear, has caused a certain 
degree of disorder: if the general picture has started to take shape, its details 
are still as blurred as those of an impressionist painting. This article attempts 
to take a step back and offer a more distanced vision of the case law, so as to 
provide a more systematic analysis of Union citizenship. In particular, it fo-
cuses on the effect that Union citizenship has had on the personal and mate-
rial scope of the Treaty; and on its constitutional effects for domestic systems 
following the ad hoc proportionality assessment demanded by the Baumbast 
line of case law.
We will start by recalling the personal scope of the economic free move-
ment provisions (section 2), and then turn to assess how the introduction of 
Union citizenship has affected the pre-existing situation. In this respect, the 
introduction of Union citizenship has not only challenged the economic para-
digm that underpins the scope of the economic free movement provisions; it 
has also challenged the migrant paradigm, so that any Union citizen now falls 
within the scope of the Treaty, without having to establish cross-border cre-
dentials (section 3).
We will then analyse the material scope of the Union citizenship provi-
sions, i.e. the rights that are granted by the Treaty to Union citizens. Here, the 
right to move and reside anywhere in the Community conferred upon Union 
* Durham University and Durham European Law Institute (DELI). I am very grateful to the 
participants to the workshop on “The Outer Limits of the Treaty” held in Cambridge on 21 and 
22 Sept. 2007, and in particular to Catherine Barnard for her comments; I am also very grateful 
to Francesco De Cecco, Michael Dougan and the editors for comments on earlier drafts. The 
usual disclaimer applies.
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citizens by Article 18(1) EC has considerably expanded the material scope 
of the Treaty; as a result, no national rule falls a priori outside the scope 
of the Treaty, since movement is enough to bring the situation within its 
scope. Thus, an increasing number of rules, especially – but not only – those 
containing a territorial element, need to be justified when they affect in any 
way the movement rights of Union citizens (Section 4). We will then turn to 
analyse the case law on the right to reside on the territory of another Member 
State, focusing in particular on the right to equal treatment (Section 5), to 
then proceed to assess whether the right to equal treatment can also be inter-
preted as a free-standing right (Section 6).
Finally, we will analyse the constitutional effects of Union citizenship, and 
especially its effects on domestic systems of judicial protection (Section 7).
2. The personal and material scope of the Treaty economic free
 movement provisions: The traditional approach
The personal scope of a piece of legislation, its ratione personae, identifies 
those to which such legislation applies, whilst the material scope, ratione 
materiae, relates to the situations to which the legislation applies. In order 
to fall within the scope of any legislation, including primary and secondary 
Community law, both conditions must be satisfied; the claimant must fall 
within the personal scope of the legislation, and the situation must fall within 
its material scope. Whilst the distinction between personal and material scope 
of Community law is not always clearly drawn out in the case law, such a 
distinction is crucial to understand the true scope of Community law. This 
is particularly the case when the piece of legislation at issue is capable of 
conferring rights on individuals: here the personal scope defines the class of 
potential right-holders, whilst the material scope defines the potential rights 
that such individuals might claim. To fully appreciate the significance of this 
distinction one might usefully recall the recent case of Dell’Orto,1 in which 
the referring court enquired as to the personal scope of the framework de-
cision on the victims of crime,2 in order to ascertain whether that piece of 
1. Case C-467/05, Dell’Orto, judgment of 28 June 2007, nyr. For another example of the 
relevance of defining the personal scope of legislation (this time Directive 92/85) see A.G. 
Kokott’s Opinion in Case C-116/06, Kiiski, delivered on 15 March 2007, case still pending at 
the time of writing.
2. Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA of 15 March 2001, on the standing of victims in 
criminal proceedings, O.J. 2001, L 82/1.
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legislation was capable of being (indirectly) invoked by a legal person.3 The 
negative answer of the Court determined the legal irrelevance of that frame-
work decision to the applicant. 
In the case of the economic free movement provisions, the Court has tend-
ed not to be explicit in defining the personal vis-à-vis the material scope of 
the Treaty. However, it seems that in order to fall within the personal scope 
of the economic free movement provisions, two conditions must be satisfied. 
First of all, the claimant must establish an “economic” link, i.e. the individual 
must be providing or must intend to provide (or receive) services for remu-
neration, whether in an employed or self employed capacity. Secondly, the 
claimant must establish the existence of a cross-border link.4 On the other 
hand, the material scope of the Treaty economic free movement provisions 
relates to the rights granted by those provisions, such as the right not to be 
discriminated against on grounds of nationality,5 the right to accept offers of 
employment, the right to move within the territory of the host Member State,6 
the right to be accompanied by family members,7 and so on. 
Admittedly, the distinction between personal and material scope of the 
Treaty economic free movement provisions is less clear-cut than one might 
first think: whilst the existence of a cross-border link is a precondition that 
needs to be satisfied in order to bring oneself within the personal scope of 
those provisions, the right to move is a right conferred upon individuals di-
rectly by the Treaty, and in that way it is correctly defined as part of the ma-
terial scope of the Treaty. However, this does not have any bearing on what 
was said above: indeed, if it were not necessary to establish a cross-border 
link in order to fall within the personal scope of the Treaty economic free 
movement provisions, then any “worker” or economic actor would be able to 
rely on the rights conferred by the Treaty and there would be no scope for the 
notion of the purely internal situation. However, this is not the way the Court 
3. Framework decisions cannot have direct effect (Art. 34(b) TEU), but following the Court 
ruling in Case C-105/03, Pupino, [2005] ECR I-5285 they might give raise to a duty of consist-
ent interpretation. 
4. Cf. Case C-419/92, Scholz v. Opera Universitaria di Cagliari, [1994] ECR I-505, para 9. 
The two conditions do not need to be related; thus a person who moves her residence to another 
Member State but continues to exercise her economic activity in her Member State of origin 
falls, by sole virtue of having moved residence, within the personal scope of the Treaty; see 
e.g. Case C-470/04, N v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Oost/kantoor Almelo, [2006] ECR 
I-7409; Case C-287/05, Hendrix, judgment of 11 Sept. 2007, nyr.
5. Cf. Art. 39(2) EC; Regulation 1612/68, O.J. sp. ed. 1968, L 257/2, p. 475; Arts. 43 and 
49 EC. 
6. E.g. Art. 39(3) EC.
7. See now Art. 2 Directive 2004/38, O.J. 2004, L 229/35, on the right of citizens of the Union
 and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. 
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has construed the Treaty free movement provisions. For instance, early on, in 
Saunders,8 the Court refused to apply the right to move within the territory of 
a Member State, a right expressly conferred by Article 39(3) EC, to a person 
who was in a purely internal situation, thus demonstrating that the establish-
ment of a cross-border link is a precondition for the possibility to claim rights 
under the Treaty economic free movement provisions.9 On the other hand, in 
Carpenter, the claimant fell within the personal scope of the Treaty by virtue 
of being an economic actor providing cross-border services, and for this rea-
son he could rely on the rights conferred by Article 49 EC.10
Thus, it appears clear that in order to fall within the personal scope of the 
economic free movement provisions and therefore be able to claim the rights 
conferred by Community law an individual must establish both the cross-bor-
der and the economic link.11 It is now time to analyse how this framework has 
been affected by the introduction of Union citizenship.
3. The personal scope of Union citizenship
The doctrinal reflection on citizenship has concentrated on composing a co-
herent picture from a fragmented jurisprudential analysis;12 on more funda-
mental issues as to the true significance of supranational citizenship;13 on the 
8. Case 175/78, R v. Saunders, [1979] ECR 1129.
9. Consistent case law; see e.g. also Joined Cases 35 & 36/82, Morson and Jhanjan v. Neth-
erlands, [1982] ECR 3273.
10. Case C-60/00, Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2002] ECR 
I-6279, esp. para 29.
11. Admittedly the requirement to establish a cross-border link has been relaxed to the point 
of becoming meaningless; see, for instance, Case C-405/98, Gourmet International (GIP), 
[2001] ECR I-1795 where the Court accepted that the existence of a potential recipient of servic-
es in another Member State was enough to establish the cross-border link; and Case C-355/00, 
Freskot, [2003] ECR I-5263, where the Court accepted that the existence of a potential provider 
of services in another Member State was enough to trigger the Treaty. 
12. E.g. O’Leary, “Putting flesh on the bones of European Union citizenhip”, 24 EL Rev. 
(1999), 68; Shaw and Fries, “Citizenship of the Union: First Steps in the European Court of 
Justice”, 4 EPL (1998), 533; Illiopoulou and Toner, “A new approach to discrimination against 
free movers? D’Hoop v Office National de l’Emploi”, 28 EL Rev. (2003), 389; Dougan and 
Spaventa, “Educating Rudy and the (non-)English patient: A double-bill on residency rights 
under Article18 EC”, 28 EL Rev. (2003), 699; Barnard, Annotation of Bidar, 42 CML Rev. 
(2005), 1465. 
13. E.g. Meehan, Citizenship and the European Community (Sage, 1993); O’Leary, The 
Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship (Kluwer Law International, 1996); O’Keeffe, “Un-
ion Citizenship” in O’Keeffe and Twomey, (Eds.) Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty (Chan-
cery Law, 1994), ch 6; Preuß, “Problems of a Concept of European Citizenship”, 1 ELJ (1995), 
267; Shaw, “The Many Past and Futures of Citizenship in the European Union”, 22 EL Rev. 
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way Union citizenship might be reshaping traditional models of solidarity 
and belonging which have characterized the post war nation States;14 and on 
the constitutional issues arising from citizenship.15 However, little, if any, at-
tention has been devoted to analysing the extent to which the introduction 
of Union citizenship might have affected the personal scope of the Treaty. 
In particular, little attention has been devoted to analysing whether migra-
tion is a precondition to claim citizenship rights; or whether, instead, migra-
tory rights are but one of the rights conferred upon Union citizens. To put it 
in other words, the question is whether in order to fall within the scope of 
Union citizenship an individual has to satisfy two conditions, migration and 
nationality; or, rather, whether nationality alone suffices to bring an individ-
ual within the personal scope of the Treaty, and movement, political rights, 
and non-discrimination are the rights enjoyed by those who fall within the 
personal scope of the Treaty, i.e. those who hold the nationality of a Member 
State. 
Here, orthodox thinking led us to believe that, in order to fall within the 
scope of the Treaty, the migration paradigm had to be satisfied for Union cit-
izens to acquire rights in Community law. The reasons for this approach are 
not difficult to trace: first of all, naturally, the focus has been on the extent to 
which Union citizenship affected, and maybe threatened, pre-existing notions 
of belonging to a given welfare community, and on the significance of a su-
pranational notion of citizenship on delicate political and social compromises 
as to allocation of limited resources to non-economically active migrants. 
Secondly, almost all citizenship cases concerned situations with a cross-bor-
der link.16 It is therefore not surprising that the distinction between personal 
and material scope of the citizenship provisions might have been overlooked.
(1997), 554; Guild, The Legal Elements of EU Identity: EU Citizenship and Migration Law 
(Kluwer Law International, 2004).
14. E.g. Barnard, “EU Citizenship and the Principle of Solidarity” and Dougan and Spaven-
ta, “‘Wish You Weren’t Here…’ New models of social solidarity in the European Union”, both in 
Dougan and Spaventa (Eds.), Social Welfare and EU Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2005), Chs. 
8 and 9; Ferrera, “Towards an ‘Open’ social citizenship? The new boundaries of welfare in the 
European Union” in De Búrca (Ed.), EU Law and the Welfare State (OUP, 2005), Ch. 2; Davis, 
“Citizenship of the Union … Rights for All” 27 EL Rev. (2002), 121; Hailbronner, “Union citi-
zenship and access to social benefits”, 42 CML Rev. (2002), 1245.
15. E.g. Jacqueson, “Union citizenship and the Court of Justice: Something new under the 
sun? Towards social citizenship”, 27 EL Rev. (2002), 260; Dougan, “The constitutional dimen-
sion to the case law on Union citizenship”, 31 EL Rev. (2006), 613; Besselink, “Dynamics of 
European and national citizenship: inclusive or exclusive?” 3 EuConst (2007), 1. 
16. See section 3.2. below for an analysis of those cases in which the cross-border element 
might have been weaker.
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And yet, to draw such a distinction is essential in order to fully appreci-
ate the legal consequences of the introduction of Union citizenship, and to 
understand the scope of Community law.17 In this respect, one of the claims 
put forward in this article is that the introduction of Union citizenship chal-
lenges the existing migrant paradigm so that in order to fall within the per-
sonal scope of the Treaty it is no longer necessary to have exercised the right 
to move. This claim is supported both by the wording of Article 17(1) EC, 
which establishes Union citizenship making it conditional only upon nation-
ality of one of the Member States;18 and by the case law of the Court. In 
relation to the latter, we can distinguish two stages in the case law: the ear-
lier case law, in which the Court implicitly afforded legal effects to Article 
17 EC; and the more recent case law, in which the Court explicitly refers to 
Article 17 EC, albeit admittedly falling short of openly declaring its legal 
consequences. 
3.1. The implicit legal effect of Article 17 EC 
As said above, Article 17(1) EC establishes Union citizenship, and there is 
no mention in that Article of the need to satisfy any other requirement but 
that of nationality of a Member State before being able to claim citizenship 
rights under the Treaty or secondary legislation. And, indeed, the right to vote 
for the European Parliament,19 the right to petition the European Parliament 
and the right to apply to the ombudsman are not conditional upon migration.20 
This said, as mentioned above, the attention of both Court and scholarship 
has focused on the legal effects of the rights to move and reside conferred 
by Article 18(1) EC rather than on the legal consequences of Article 17 EC. 
And yet, a careful reading of the earlier case law demonstrates that Article 
17 EC is capable of having some legal effects. Take for instance the case of 
17. Not least, since the general principles of Community law only apply to determine the 
lawfulness of limitations to the rights granted by the Treaty (material scope) and not to the in-
terpretation of its personal scope.
18. And it is not open to the Member States to question the rules of other Member States 
concerning the grant of nationality, e.g. Case C-369/90, Micheletti, [1992] ECR I-4239; Case 
C-200/02, Chen, [2004] ECR I-9925.
19. See Case C-300/04, Eman and Sevinger, [2006] ECR I-8055, and A.G. Tizzano’s Opin-
ion para 146: “… persons possessing the nationality of a Member State are citizens of the Union 
and therefore, in principle and regardless of where they live, enjoy all rights available to such 
citizens under Community law, including naturally those provided for in the second part of the 
Treaty” (emphasis added).
20. Cf. Art. 21 EC; such rights are not exclusive to Union citizens, see Arts. 194 and 195 
EC.
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Martínez Sala.21 There the Court explicitly held that since Mrs Martínez Sala 
was a Union citizen, it was not necessary to investigate whether she derived a 
right to reside from Article 18(1) EC in order to assess the compatibility with 
Community law of a discriminatory requirement in relation to a non-contrib-
utory benefit falling within the material scope of the Treaty.22 Since Article 
18(1) EC was not relevant, then the trigger for the application of the prin-
ciple of equal treatment must have been Article 17 EC, i.e. the fact that Mrs 
Martínez Sala was a Union citizen. In this respect, the fact that Mrs Martínez 
Sala was a lawfully resident migrant citizen does not have any bearing on the 
conclusion that it was by virtue of Article 17 EC, not 18 EC, that she could 
claim rights in Community law. 
In D’Hoop,23 the Court pointed at a clear distinction between the personal 
and the material scope of the Treaty: the former concerns “every person hold-
ing the nationality of a Member State”.24 The material scope, which allows 
those who find themselves in similar circumstances to enjoy a right to equal 
treatment, “include those [situations] involving the exercise of the funda-
mental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, in particular those involving the 
freedom to move and reside within the territory of the Member States, as 
conferred by Article 8a [now 18] of the EC Treaty”.25 Thus, Union citizens 
by definition fall within the personal scope of the Treaty, and the migratory 
rights conferred therein (part of the material scope) are only some of the 
rights conferred upon Union citizens by the Treaty. 
In Baumbast,26 the Court first stated that Mr Baumbast was covered by 
Article 17 EC as a Union citizen (personal scope), clarifying that that status 
is not conditional upon pursuing an economic activity, to then analyse the 
rights that Mr Baumbast derived from his status, i.e. the right to reside (mate-
rial scope).27 In Trojani, the Court held that Mr Trojani had a right to rely on 
Article 18(1) EC (material scope) simply by virtue of being a citizen of the 
Union (personal scope).28 In Collins the Court held that a lawfully resident 
21. Case C-85/96, M M Martínez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, [1998] ECR I-2691.
22. Ibid., esp. paras 59 and 60. 
23. Case C-224/98, M N D’Hoop v. Office national d’emploi, [2002] ECR I-6191.
24. Ibid., para 27. This section of the ruling is entitled “The scope ratione personae and 
ratione materiae of the Treaty provisions on citizenship of the Union”
25. D’Hoop, supra note 23, para 29, our emphasis. See also Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk, 
[2001] ECR I-6193, para 33. 
26. Case C-413/99, Baumbast and R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2002] 
ECR I-7091.
27. Ibid., paras 82 and 83.
28. Case C-456/02, Trojani, [2004] ECR I-7573, para 31. “It must be recalled that the right 
to reside in the territory of the Member States is conferred directly on every citizen of the Union 
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citizen in the territory of a host State can rely on Article 12 EC in all situa-
tions which fall within the scope ratione materiae of Community law.29
Thus, it is clear from the earlier case law that a Union citizen is taken 
within the personal scope of the Treaty by sole virtue of Article 17(1) EC. 
However, it should be noted that in all the above mentioned cases there was 
a strong element of migration, in that the claimant was either a non-nation-
al (Martínez Sala, Baumbast, Trojani, Collins), or was being discriminated 
against on grounds of movement (D’Hoop).
3.2. The more recent case law: exploring the legal effects of Article 17 EC 
Whilst, as said above, the earlier case law concerned cases with a strong mi-
gratory element, and might therefore seem inconclusive, more recent cases 
suggest that Article 17 EC might be read independently from Article 18(1) 
EC. For instance, in Gaumain-Cerri and Barth,30 the issue related to the 
compatibility with Community law of rules which made the receipt of some 
benefits conditional upon residence within the Member State’s territory. Af-
ter having found that the benefits in question were covered by Regulation 
1408/71,31 thereby falling within the material scope of Community law, the 
Court decided that it was not necessary to investigate whether one of the 
claimants concerned was to be qualified as a “worker” falling within the 
personal scope of either the Regulation, or Article 39 EC. Instead the Court 
found that the claimants were Union citizens according to Article 17 EC 
(personal scope), and that that status enabled those “who find themselves in 
the same situation to enjoy within the scope of the Treaty the same treatment 
in law, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for” (material 
scope).32 Accordingly, the residence criterion was found to be incompatible 
with Community law. 
by Article 18(1) EC …. Mr Trojani therefore has the right to rely on that provision of the Treaty 
simply as a citizen of the Union” (emphasis added).
29. Case C-138/02, Collins, [2004] ECR I-2703, para 61. In Case C-148/02, Garcia Avello, 
[2003] ECR I-11613, the Court held that the effect of the citizenship provisions was not to 
broaden the material scope of the Treaty; it did not comment upon the effect of such provisions 
on its personal scope.
30. Joined Cases C-502/01 & C-31/02, Gaumain Cerri and Barth, [2004] ECR I-6483. 
31. Council Regulation (EEC) 1408/71, consolidated version O.J. 1997, L 28/1, and <www.
europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/consleg/pdf/1971/en_1971R1408_do_001.pdf>, on the application of 
social security schemes to employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their 
families moving within the Community; soon to be replaced by Regulation 883/2004, O.J. 2004, 
L 166/1, on the coordination of social security systems.
32. Gaumain Cerri and Barth, supra note 30, para 34. 
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In Schempp, the Court again relied on Article 17 EC and held that “… 
Article 17(2) EC attaches to the status of citizen of the Union the rights and 
duties laid down by the Treaty, including the right to rely on Article 12 EC in 
all situations falling within the material scope of Community law”.33 In this 
case, the issue concerned tax rules imposed on a German citizen residing in 
Germany: as a result of the fact that his former wife moved to Austria, Mr 
Schempp found himself in a less favourable situation in relation to the tax 
treatment of the alimony he paid her. The German Government argued that 
since Mr Schempp had not taken advantage of his right to move, the situa-
tion fell outside the scope of the Treaty and it was purely internal. The Court 
rejected this argument and found that since Mr Schempp’s former wife had 
exercised her right to move, the situation could not be seen as purely internal, 
and Article 12 EC was therefore applicable. The Court then based its reason-
ing on a combined application of Article 18(1) EC and Article 12 EC.34 In 
any event, the exercise of Article 18(1) EC rights was relevant in establishing 
the material scope of the Treaty, not its personal scope (or else the nationality 
of Mr Schempp would have been irrelevant, the only relevant link being the 
nationality of his former wife).
 Finally, in Tas-Hagen and Tas,35 the Court accepted that the scope ratione 
personae of the Treaty had been affected by the introduction of Union citi-
zenship. Thus, in analysing a residence condition imposed on those in receipt 
of a pension for civilian war victims, the Court held that Union citizens fell 
within the personal scope of the Treaty by virtue of Article 17 EC, and that 
therefore they were entitled to the rights conferred upon them by the Treaty, 
33. Case C-403/03, Schempp, [2005] ECR I-6421, para 17.
34. The Court’s interpretation seems rather artificial for two reasons. First, there is a certain 
discordance in the finding that the exercise of a right to move by a person other than the claim-
ant brings, for that reason alone, the matter within the material scope of Community law. In 
this respect, Schempp can be distinguished from Case C-76/05, Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz, 
judgment of 11 Sept. 2007, nyr, because of the inherent difference in the type of link existing 
between ex-spouses on the one hand, and children who are dependent on their parents on the 
other. Secondly, the reasoning of the Court seems to suggest that had Mr Schempp’s former wife 
been a third country national, and all other things being equal, the situation would have fallen 
outside the scope of the Treaty, a result which seems rather arbitrary.
35. Case C-192/05, Tas-Hagen and Tas, [2006] ECR I-10451, paras. 18 and 19; “18. Regard-
ing the scope ratione personae of that provision, suffice it to state that, under Article 17(1) EC, 
every person holding the nationality of a Member State is a citizen of the Union. Furthermore, 
Article 17(2) EC attributes to citizens of the Union the rights conferred and duties imposed by 
the Treaty, including those mentioned in Article 18(1) EC. [19] As Netherlands nationals, Mrs 
Tas-Hagen and Mr Tas enjoy the status of citizens of the Union under Article 17(1) EC and may 
therefore benefit from the rights conferred on those having that status, such as, inter alia the 
right to move and to reside freely within the territory of the Member States conferred by Article 
18(1) EC”.
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including the rights provided for in Article 18(1) EC. As a result, and as we 
shall see in more detail below, a residence requirement in relation to benefits 
previously excluded from the material scope of the Treaty, now falls within 
the scope of Community law (as a limitation of the right to movement). The 
same reasoning can be found in Morgan,36 where the Court held that since 
the claimants were Union citizens they could rely on the rights conferred on 
“those having that status”, also against their Member State of origin.37
From the case law referred to above, it seems clear that in order to fall 
within the personal scope of the Treaty, nationality alone is sufficient. Whilst 
this might seem uncontroversial, if not altogether banal, its consequences are 
less so. If Union citizens fall within the personal scope of the Treaty by virtue 
of Article 17 EC, and since that Article does not mention migration, then any 
citizen, and not only the migrant, now falls within the personal scope of the 
Treaty and is therefore able to rely on it whenever the situation falls within 
its material scope. The effect of the citizenship provisions is then to broaden 
considerably the personal scope of the Treaty in that for the first time static 
citizens acquire general Community law credentials.38 The extent to which 
this has practical implications will then depend upon the material scope of 
the Treaty, i.e. upon the rights that the Union citizen is able to claim. We shall 
start by analysing the right to move and the right to reside, and then turn to 
investigate the extent to which Union citizens can claim the right to equal 
treatment granted by Article 12 EC. 
4. The material scope of the Treaty – The right to move and reside
 within the European Community 
Article 18(1) EC grants a directly effective right to move around the Commu-
nity,39 as well as the right to reside in any of the Member States.40 Both rights 
36. Case C-11/06, Morgan, judgment of 23 Oct. 2007, nyr; see also Schwarz and Gootjes-
Schwarz, supra note 34. 
37. Daniele has noted how almost half of the Union citizenship cases have involved claims 
of Union citizens against their Member State of nationality; “Free movement of Union citizens 
and free movement of economically active persons: What’s the difference?”, Durham European 
Law Institute seminar, 5 Nov. 2007, not published.
38. Of course, in relation to specified fields, static citizens have always enjoyed Community 
law rights, e.g. in relation to equal treatment on grounds of sex under Art. 141 EC.
39. Baumbast, supra note 26.
40. We are not concerned here with the “core” citizenship rights, i.e. right to stand and vote 
for the European Parliament; the right to petition the European Parliament; the right to apply to 
the Ombudsman; and the right to consular protection from other Member States when outside 
the territory of the Union. Those rights are not always confined to Union citizens; e.g. in Case 
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are subject to the limitations and conditions contained in the Treaty and in 
secondary legislation.
The right to move is unconditional, i.e. it is not subject to any requirement 
as to resources or health insurance, and is broadly construed. It encompasses 
the right to exit from, and enter into, the territory of any of the Member 
States, which can be restricted only for reasons of public policy, security and 
health,41 interpreted narrowly and subject to the general principles of Com-
munity law.42 Consistently with its case law on the economic free movement 
provisions,43 the Court has construed the right to movement as also encom-
passing a right not to be discriminated against on grounds of movement.44 
However, the reach of Article 18(1) EC is much greater than the reach of the 
economic free movement provisions, since it is no longer necessary to estab-
lish a connection between an economic element and right to move. From a 
practical viewpoint this entails two developments: first, Union citizens have 
an enhanced right to challenge the rules imposed by their Member State of 
nationality; secondly, no rule, as such, can be excluded from the scope of the 
Treaty. Both developments are clearly visible in the case law of the Court. 
Thus, in D’Hoop, the Court made clear that Member States cannot impose 
rules which have the effect of placing at a disadvantage their own citizens 
who have exercised the right to move.45 And the more recent case law high-
lights the extent to which the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of 
movement impacts on national rules and especially on those rules which are 
more likely to contain a territorial element, such as tax and welfare benefit 
rules. For instance, in the above mentioned case of Schempp,46 the Court 
accepted that German tax rules which had the effect of placing at a disad-
vantage the tax-payer only because his former wife had moved place of resi-
C-145/04, Spain v. United Kingdom, [2006] ECR I-7917, the Court clarified that Member States 
might grant the right to vote for the European Parliament to those who are not Union citizens for 
the purposes of Community law; or the fact that Arts. 194 and 195 EC confer the right to write 
to the institutions or complain to the Ombudsman on TCNs and foreign companies lawfully 
resident in the Union.
41. See recently Case C-50/06, Commission v. Netherlands, judgment of 7 June 2007, nyr. 
42. Member States are entitled to impose administrative formalities, although those, as well 
as the penalties for failure to comply, need to respect the principle of proportionality; Case C-
378/97, Wijsenbeek, [1999] ECR I-6207; and Directive 2004/38, cited supra note 7. 
43. E.g. Case C-237/94, O’Flynn, [1996] ECR I-2617, para 18; Case C-195/98, Österreichi-
scher Gewerkschaftsbund, Gewerkschaft öffentlicher Dienst v. Republik Österreich, [2000] 
ECR I-10497. 
44. E.g. D’Hoop, supra note 23.
45. D’Hoop, supra note 23; the reasoning of the Court is a bit confused, referring both to 
discrimination on grounds of nationality and to discrimination on grounds of movement. The 
latter however was the deciding factor. 
46. Schempp, supra note 33.
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dence fell within the scope of Article 12 and 18(1) EC. In Schwarz,47 the 
Court found that rules which allowed tax relief only in relation to fees paid 
to (some) private educational establishment in Germany fell foul of Article 
18(1) EC since those rules had the effect of placing individuals at a disad-
vantage “simply” because they had exercised their right to move.48 In De 
Cuyper,49 a similar reasoning applied in relation to a residence requirement 
in relation to unemployment benefits: as a result, Belgian rules that provided 
that those in receipt of such benefits had to reside within the national terri-
tory were found to fall within the scope of Article 18(1) EC. The ruling in De 
Cuyper is a good example of the far-reaching consequences of the case law: 
pre-Union citizenship, the residence requirement would have not been subject 
to the proportionality/necessity scrutiny since it was compatible with Regula-
tion 1408/71;50 post-Union citizenship, the residence requirement needed to 
undergo the scrutiny as to whether it was justified (which it was).
As for the changes in the type of rule that can be brought within the scope 
of the Treaty, such development is visible in the cases of Tas-Hagen and Tas 
and in Morgan. In Tas-Hagen and Tas,51 the issue related to a rule which 
made the award of a pension for civilian war victims conditional upon resi-
dence in the national territory. According to established case law (which has 
not been affected by the ruling) such benefits fall outside the scope of the 
Treaty,52 and therefore are not caught by the prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of nationality provided for in Article 7(2) Regulation 1612/68. How-
ever, the issue in Tas-Hagen and Tas was whether it was open to a Member 
State to refuse payment of such a benefit for the sole reason that the ben-
eficiary had moved to another Member State. The Court, not surprisingly, 
found that the rules at issue affected the claimants’ right to move and reside 
anywhere in the Community and for that reason (and not because of a change 
in classification of the benefit in question) fell within the scope of Article 
18(1) EC.53 In Morgan,54 the German rules provided that in order to obtain a 
47. Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz, supra note 34.
48. See also Case C-224/02, Pusa, [2004] ECR I-5763; Case C-520/04, Turpeinen, [2006] 
ECR I-10685.
49. Case C-406/04, De Cuyper, [2006] ECR I-6947.
50. Ibid.
51. Tas-Hagen and Tas, supra note 35; and Cf. also Pusa, supra note 48, which related to 
rules concerning enforcement for the recovery of debt. On these issue see Cousins, “Citizenship, 
Residence and Social Security”, 32 EL Rev. (2007), 386. 
52. Case 9/78, Gillard, [1978] ECR 1661; Case 207/78, Even, [1979] ECR 2019; in Case 
C-386/02, Baldinger, [2004] ECR I-8411, the Court did not consider the relevance of the Union 
citizenship provisions in relation to benefits for victims of war. 
53. To this end cf. A.G. Kokott’s Opinion in Tas-Hagen and Tas, supra note 35, esp. paras 
25 et seq.
54. Case C-11/06, Morgan, judgment of 23 Oct. 2007, nyr.
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study grant for studying abroad two conditions had to be satisfied: first, the 
claimant had to have been enrolled in a German institution for at least a year; 
and secondly, the claimant had to continue the same course of study abroad. 
Those conditions were very similar to those at issue in the case of Wirth,55 
where the Court found that the Treaty did not apply for lack of economic ele-
ment. In Morgan, however, the rules were scrutinized under the right to move 
conferred by Article 18(1) EC: the Court then found that the rules imposed a 
barrier to movement, and that they were disproportionate. 
The conceptual underpinning for both strands of case law is the same: 
rules containing a territorial element, such as a residence requirement, affect 
the right to move of Union citizens, as well as the right to choose their place 
of residence. For this reason those rules are compatible with the Treaty only 
insofar as they pursue a legitimate aim in a proportionate way. In this respect, 
the case law can be seen from two, not necessarily exclusive, perspectives. 
Thus, it can be argued that in all those cases what mattered was discrimina-
tion against movers: those who had moved, or who had returned after having 
exercised their right to move, were at a disadvantage compared to those who 
had not moved. Or else, it could be argued that the right to move enshrined 
in Article 18(1) EC is of broader application and that it also encompasses 
non-discriminatory barriers to movement.56 The reasoning of the Court in 
Morgan seems to be going in that direction: and yet, some caution should 
be exercised since whilst the choice between the two approaches might be of 
little relevance in those instances in which the rules under scrutiny are those 
imposed by the Member State of origin, the finding that Article 18(1) EC 
also encompasses a prohibition on non-discriminatory barriers to movement 
might have more pervasive effects when applied to barriers imposed by the 
host Member State.
Finally, it should be queried whether the right to move and reside con-
ferred by Article 18(1) EC can be relied upon to claim a right to move and 
reside anywhere in the territory of one’s own Member State. In this respect, 
and notwithstanding the otherwise broad and teleological interpretation given 
to Article 18(1) EC, the Court has indicated that it does not apply to situa-
tions with no trans-border element.57 However, as noted by Advocate General 
Sharpston, there is no textual obstacle to interpret Article 18(1) EC as being 
available also to Union citizens wanting to move, or choose their place of 
residence, within the territory of their own Member State.58
55. Case C-109/92, Wirth, [1993] ECR I-6447.
56. Cf. A.G. Jacobs Opinion in Case C-96/04, Familiensache: Standesamt Stadt Niebüll, 
[2006] ECR I-3561. 
57. See Garcia Avello, supra note 29. 
58. Case C-212/06, Government of the French Community and the Walloon Government v. 
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5. The material scope of the Treaty: The right to reside in the
 territory of another Member State
Article 18(1) EC confers also the right to reside in the territory of anoth-
er Member State subject to the limitations and conditions contained in the 
Treaty and in secondary legislation. In particular, after the first three months 
of stay,59 Directive 2004/38 makes the right of residence conditional upon 
possession of sufficient economic resources and comprehensive health insur-
ance.60 If the Union citizen satisfies these two conditions, then the right of 
residence can be refused only on public policy and public security grounds.61 
 However, since the right of residence is conferred directly by Article 18(1) 
EC, the conditions of sufficient resources and comprehensive health insur-
ance must be interpreted having regard to the general principles of Com-
munity law, in particular proportionality and fundamental rights. As a result, 
even when the Union citizen fails to satisfy the black letter requirements of 
Directive 2004/38, she might still gain a right of residence directly from Arti-
cle 18(1) EC.62 Thus, for instance, in Baumbast,63 the claimant could not rely 
on (then) Directive 90/364 to establish his right of residence since, although 
he had both sufficient resources and medical insurance, his insurance was not 
comprehensive as it did not cover emergency treatment. 
Establishing the direct effect of Article 18(1) EC, the Court held that na-
tional authorities and, where necessary, national courts must ensure that the 
limitations and conditions imposed on the right to reside are applied having 
due regard to the general principles of Community law.64 In the case at issue, 
the Court indicated that it would be disproportionate not to renew Mr Baum-
bast’s residence permit given that, even though he did not have cover for 
emergency treatment, he had lived in the United Kingdom for several years; 
that his family resided there; that neither he or his family relied on British 
welfare provision; and that both he and his family had comprehensive medi-
cal insurance in another Member State. In Trojani, on the other hand, the 
the Flemish Government, Opinion delivered on 28 June 2007, case still pending at the time of 
writing.
59. The right to stay for the first three months is unconditional; Art. 6 Directive 2004/38.
60. Art. 7 Directive 2004/38; the right to reside of those engaged in an economic activity is 
of course unconditional. 
61. After the first three months of residence Member States cannot rely on the public health 
derogation; cf. Art. 29(2) Directive 2004/38.
62. See Dougan and Spaventa, op. cit. supra note 12, 699.
63. Baumbast, supra note 26.
64. Baumbast, supra note 26, para 94.
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claimant’s circumstances, and in particular his lack of economic resources, 
meant that the refusal of a residence right would not be disproportionate.65
Furthermore, the application of the principle of proportionality means that 
a Member State cannot refuse residency rights on the grounds that the re-
sources are not the claimant’s own, but rather are provided by a third party. In 
Chen the Court had already held that it would be contrary to the requirements 
imposed by Directive 90/364 (now subsumed in Directive 2004/38) to deny 
the right to reside to a minor on the grounds that she did not possess resourc-
es of her own but was relying on her mother’s resources.66 In Commission v. 
Belgium,67 the principle of proportionality prevented Belgium to deny a right 
of residence to a Union citizen who was relying on an undertaking provided 
by her partner in relation to the availability of sufficient resources. The Court 
thus dismissed the Belgian Government’s contention that since there was no 
legal obligation arising from such a partnership, there was an enhanced risk 
that the relationship might be severed and that, as a consequence, the Union 
citizen might become a burden on its welfare resources. In the eyes of the 
Court, such an approach was disproportionate since the loss of sufficient re-
sources is always an underlying risk, whether those resources are the citizen’s 
own or those of a third party. 
5.1. The right not to be discriminated on grounds of nationality as an
 ancillary right
As we have seen, one of the main effects of Union citizenship is the redefini-
tion of the scope of application of the Treaty, as a result of which anyone who 
has exercised her right to move and/or reside in another Member State pursu-
ant to Article 18(1) EC, finds herself, for that reason alone, also within the 
material scope of the Treaty. As Article 12 EC provides for the prohibition 
of discrimination on grounds of nationality within the scope of application 
of the Treaty, the combined effect of Articles 18(1) and 12 EC is to confer 
upon any migrant the right not to be discriminated, directly or indirectly, on 
grounds of nationality.68 Furthermore, since the situation is brought within the 
material scope of the Treaty by the exercise of the right to move, rather than 
65. Trojani, supra note 28, para 36; the Court held that since Mr Trojani was lawfully resi-
dent he had in any event a right to equal treatment pursuant to Art. 12 EC, see infra section 5.1.
66. Case C-200/02, Chen, [2004] ECR I-9925. 
67. Case C-408/03, Commission v. Belgium, [2006] ECR I-2647.
68. Economically inactive Union citizens benefited from a limited right to equal treatment 
by virtue of their status as service recipients; e.g. Case 186/87, Cowan v. Trésor Public, [1989] 
ECR 195; Case C-45/93, Commission v. Spain, (Museum admission), [1994] ECR I-911; Case 
C-274/96, Bickel and Franz, [1998] ECR I-1121, and see infra section 6.1.
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(for instance) by the exercise of the right to engage in an economic activity, 
there is no “inherent” limit to the possibility to invoke the right to equal treat-
ment. In other words, since the link with the Treaty is provided by the mere 
fact of moving, there cannot be any benefit or rule which is excluded a priori 
from the scope of the Treaty. 
In this respect, consider for instance the case of Bidar,69 where the Court 
held that a Union citizen lawfully resident in the territory of the host State 
could rely on the principle of equal treatment in relation to a student’s loan, 
a benefit which previously would have been legitimately reserved to own 
nationals and migrant workers (and their families).70 Or the case of Garcia 
Avello,71 in many respects more exemplary of the pervasive effect of Union 
citizenship. In that case, the issue related to the Belgian rules on the determi-
nation of surnames. The Garcia-Avellos, a Spanish-Belgian couple, wished 
to have the surname of their children determined according to the Spanish 
rules on surnames, following which the surname is determined by combining 
the father’s and the mother’s last name. However, since the children had been 
born in Belgium, the Belgian authorities registered the children following 
Belgian law, without taking into account the fact that the children had already 
been registered at the Spanish embassy with the double surname. Pre-citizen-
ship, the case would (or should) have fallen outside the scope of the Treaty;72 
however, since the matter fell within the scope of the Treaty by virtue of the 
fact that the children had dual nationality, and that (in the Court’s view) the 
application of Belgian rules might have led to some sort of future inconve-
nience had they wanted to move to Spain, the principle of non-discrimination 
on grounds of nationality applied. As the right of non-discrimination encom-
passes also the right to be treated differently where the situation of the Union 
citizen holding the nationality of another Member State is not comparable to 
that of Belgium’s own citizens, the Belgian authorities could not apply their 
own rules on the determination of surnames, as that would breach the right to 
equal treatment conferred upon Union citizens by Article 12 EC. 
The right not to be discriminated against on grounds of nationality is 
naturally relative: thus, it remains open to the Member States to exclude 
non-nationals from certain benefits when the non-national Union citizen is 
69. Case C-209/03, Bidar, [2005] ECR I-2119.
70. Case 263/86, Humbel, [1988] ECR 5365.
71. Garcia Avello, supra note 29. See generally the critical case note by Ackermann, 44 
CML Rev. (2007), 141–154.
72. In Case C-168/91, Konstantinidis v. Stadt Altensteig, Standesamt und Landratsamt 
Calw, Ordnungsamt, [1993] ECR I-1191, the Court accepted that rules on transliteration of a 
Greek name could fall within the scope of the Treaty to the extent they affected the pursuit of 
an economic activity. 
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objectively in a different situation from the national. In this respect, the ruling 
in Tas-Hagen and Tas should not be construed as affecting previous case law 
on benefits awarded because of the special link of nationality, such as war 
veteran pensions.73 In relation to those benefits, the national and non-national 
are not in comparable circumstances and therefore the host Member State 
does not have to justify the exclusion of non-nationals from such benefits. It 
is important to stress that the non-comparability assessment differs from the 
justificatory assessment inherent in cases of indirect discrimination for two 
reasons: first of all, because if the two situations are deemed comparable, di-
rectly discriminatory rules can be justified, if at all, only having regard to the 
Treaty derogations. Secondly, because if the situations are not comparable, 
the matter is not affected by Article 12 EC and, since it does not need to be 
justified, there should be no need to scrutinize compliance with proportional-
ity and fundamental rights. Thus, in cases of non-comparability, the personal 
circumstances of the migrant Union citizen should be immaterial.
Furthermore, it is open to Member States to justify indirectly discrimina-
tory criteria, especially in relation to the award of welfare benefits. Thus, the 
Court has accepted that entitlement to benefits might be conditional upon 
lawful residence.74 However, the Court has also clarified that once the Union 
citizen is lawfully resident in the host State, by virtue of national or Com-
munity law, he/she is entitled to equal treatment and therefore the only av-
enue open to the Member State in order to avoid granting the benefit is that 
of terminating the Union citizen’s residence.75 Moreover, since the right to 
reside derives directly from the Treaty, the Member States have to respect 
the principle of proportionality and fundamental rights before terminating 
residence. This means that reliance on welfare provision cannot automatically 
lead to termination of residence, and the personal circumstances of the claim-
ant must be taken into account.76 
The stress upon lawful residence might lead to the conclusion that the right 
to equal treatment is conditional upon such a requirement being met.77 How-
73. This would still be the case in relation to a claim against the host State for benefits award-
ed because of the special link of nationality, such as war veteran pensions, see Case 207/78, 
Even, [1979] ECR 2019. As said above, however, once the claimant fulfils the criteria for the 
award of such benefits, Member States cannot make the entitlement of such benefits conditional 
upon residence in the national territory: Tas-Hagen and Tas, supra note 35.
74. E.g. Martínez Sala, supra note 21; Trojani, supra note 28.
75. E.g. Grzelczyk, supra note 25; Trojani, supra note 28. 
76. Grzelczyk, supra note 25; this principle has been codified in Art. 14(3) Directive 
2004/38.
77. In Trojani, supra note 28, the Court held that a Union citizen can rely on Art. 12 EC if 
he/she has been lawfully resident for a certain time or has a residence permit (para 43); see also 
Bidar, supra note 69, para 37.
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ever, the opposite is true. Any migrant can rely on Article 12 EC to claim 
equal treatment with nationals,78 but welfare provision can be legitimately re-
served to lawfully resident Union citizens, as such a requirement might either 
not breach the principle of equal treatment at all, since residents and non-res-
idents are not in comparable situations vis-à-vis welfare provision;79 or it may 
be justified, in that it is legitimate for the Member States to require that those 
who claim welfare benefits are lawfully resident in their territory.
Moreover, Member States are entitled to lay down criteria for entitlement 
to benefits which, whilst affecting non-nationals more than own citizens, 
pursue a legitimate aim and are proportionate. In particular, the Court has 
accepted that Member States might impose conditions relating to length of 
stay in relation to certain benefits (unemployment allowances;80 maintenance 
loans81), so as to ensure that the claimant has a real link with the domes-
tic employment market or is sufficiently integrated in the host-State.82 For 
instance, in the above-mentioned case of Bidar, the Court held that it was 
legitimate for a Member State to confer entitlement to a student’s loan only 
to those students who had demonstrated a certain degree of integration in the 
host State; and, found that, as a matter of principle, rules which require resi-
dence for a certain length of time, before qualifying for the benefit, would be 
appropriate. However, the Court also clarified that those rules cannot be so 
rigid, or may not be applied in such a rigid way, as to prevent someone who 
has established the required degree of integration from obtaining the benefit. 
6. Reversing reverse discrimination: The right not to be
 discriminated against on grounds of nationality as a
 self-standing right
We have seen in the previous section that migrant Union citizens can always 
rely on Article 12 EC since they always fall within the material scope of the 
Treaty. The next issue worth analysing is whether the right not to be discrimi-
nated against can be relied upon by Union citizens who have not exercised 
their right to move. As we said above, static citizens fall within the personal 
scope of the Treaty by virtue of Article 17(1) EC; the question is therefore 
78. E.g. Case C-274/96, Bickel and Franz, [1998] ECR I-1121.
79. See Dougan and Spaventa, op. cit. supra note 14, p. 181; and also Dougan, op. cit. supra 
note 15, at 629.
80. Collins, supra note 29.
81. Bidar, supra note 69.
82. Collins, supra note 29. Cf. also Barnard, Annotation of Bidar, 42 CML Rev. (2005), 
1465, who talks about a “quantitative approach” to equal treatment (at 1468). 
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whether Article 12 EC can be interpreted as being one of the rights con-
ferred upon Union citizens to which Article 17(2) EC refers.83 This question 
is of paramount importance not only in order to determine the scope of the 
Treaty, but also, and more importantly, in order to understand the true nature 
of Union citizenship.
If the right to equal treatment is construed as being conditional upon 
status, albeit a migratory one rather than gender or wealth, the potential of 
Union citizenship cannot stretch beyond a pro-integrationist rhetoric, which 
touches upon the lives of a comparatively negligible amount of citizens. If, 
on the other hand, Union citizenship is destined to become the fundamental 
status of Member States’ nationals,84 enabling those who find themselves in 
comparable situations to be treated equally, its effects cannot be made con-
ditional upon migration, anymore than they can be made conditional upon 
economic circumstances. 
In this respect, there is a tension within the Court’s case law. On the one 
hand, the effect of Union citizenship is to free nationals of Member States 
from the requirement of economic activity, or economic self sufficiency. On 
the other hand, the rights that Union citizens derive from the Treaty seem to 
be still conditional upon the establishment of a cross-border dimension of 
sort.
In this respect, whilst it is true that the right to residence is still inexorably 
linked to the economic fortunes of the citizen, the migrant citizen enjoys 
palpable rights regardless of economic status. First of all, the right to move 
which, as we said above, is unconditional; secondly, and more importantly, 
the migrant enjoys a right to be treated in a proportionate way exactly be-
cause, whilst the ambition of Union citizenship may naturally clash with the 
economic reality of national welfare States, the requirement of possessing a 
given amount of resources is construed as a limitation, however legitimate, 
to the rights granted to Union citizens. If, then, we free ourselves from pre-
conceptions about sharing a portion of our collective wealth with those who 
are in temporary need, is there a convincing basis, textual or teleological, to 
defend the position according to which static Union citizens are not as digni-
fied citizens as those who migrate?85
83. See also Spaventa, Free Movement of Persons in the European Union – Barriers to 
Movement in their Constitutional Context, (Kluwer Law International, 2007).
84. Although the Union institutions take a more restrictive stance as to the significance of the 
“fundamental status” of Union citizens; cf. whereas 3, Directive 2004/38 which states “Union 
citizenship shall be the fundamental status of nationals of Member States when they exercise 
their right of free movement and residence. …” (emphasis added). 
85. It should be noted that Directive 2004/38 applies only to Union nationals “who move to 
or reside in a Member State other than that of which they are a national” (Art. 3), and therefore 
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In order to answer this question it is necessary to examine the scope of ap-
plication of Article 12 EC, as construed by the Court, to assess whether such 
a provision is capable of granting rights only when the claimant falls within 
the personal scope of the Treaty and the situation falls within its material 
scope; or whether it is sufficient that either the claimant falls within the per-
sonal scope of the Treaty or the situation falls within its material scope.
6.1. The scope of application of Article 12 EC in the case law of the
 Court
According to its wording, Article 12 EC applies within the scope of applica-
tion of the Treaty; however, the Treaty does not specify whether, in order for 
the right of non-discrimination to apply, it is sufficient for the claimant to 
fall within the personal scope of application of the Treaty; or whether it is 
also necessary for the matter to fall within the material scope of the Treaty. 
In other words, is Article 12 EC one of the rights granted as such to Union 
citizens, which would mean that it is also available to static citizens; or is Ar-
ticle 12 EC an ancillary provision which can be relied upon only to the extent 
to which the citizen also falls within the material scope of application of the 
Treaty? 
We have seen above that the Court’s approach to the scope of application 
of Article 12 EC, at least in those cases relating to Article 18(1) EC, seems to 
indicate the ancillary nature of that provision. Thus, in D’Hoop,86 the Court 
held that the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality ap-
plies within the scope ratione materiae of the Treaty, and a similar state-
ment is to be found in Schempp.87 Furthermore, in Garcia Avello the Court 
explicitly held that the material scope of the Treaty had not been affected by 
the Union citizenship provisions and therefore the Treaty does not apply to 
static Union citizens do not come within its scope and cannot claim a right to equal treatment 
by reason of either Art. 24 of that Directive, Art. 12 EC, or the general principles of Commu-
nity law. In this respect, the Directive is narrower than the existing case law, in that it does not 
specify that the returning migrant should be equated to the migrant for the purposes of Com-
munity law (Case C-370/90, The Queen v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal et Surinder Singh, ex 
parte Secretary of State for Home Department, [1992] ECR I-4265). However, this is unlikely 
to have any bearing on the existing case law. The abolition of reverse discrimination has been 
long advocated by the scholarship, see e.g. D’Oliveira, “The Community Case – Is reverse dis-
crimination still permissible under the Single European Act?” in Forty years on: the Evolution 
of Postwar Private International Law in Europe, Kluwer, Amsterdam, 1990, 71–86; and more 
recently Nic Shuibhne, “Free movement of persons and the wholly internal rule: Time to move 
on?”, 39 CML Rev. (2002), 731.
86. D’Hoop, supra note 23, para 28.
87. Schempp, supra note 33, para 17.
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purely internal situations.88 Thus, in the citizenship cases, the Court consid-
ers the scope of application of Article 12 EC to be limited to those cases in 
which the situation falls within the material scope of the Treaty. 
However, the Court’s reasoning is not always persuasive. Thus, the Court 
has held that a situation might fall within the material scope of Commu-
nity law by sole virtue of a provision of secondary legislation, even when the 
claimant does not fall within the personal scope of said secondary legislation. 
For instance, in Martínez Sala,89 the Court found that the benefit in question 
fell within the material scope of Community law by virtue of Regulations 
1612/68 and 1408/71. And yet, it is questionable whether secondary legisla-
tion which guarantees equal treatment in respect of benefits for economically 
active people, might bring the situation within the material scope of Com-
munity law even when the claimant is not economically active and therefore 
does not fall within the personal scope of the relevant provisions.90 In other 
words, the situation fell within the material scope of the Treaty since an eco-
nomically active migrant would have had the right in question, even though 
such right was granted only to economically active migrants because those 
who are active contributors to the host State’s economic life have a right in 
Community law to become active claimants. The link with the material scope 
of the Treaty in this case is so artificial and flimsy to seem rather meaning-
less.91 And, in the above-mentioned case of Garcia Avello,92 the Court ap-
plied Article 12 EC in conjunction with Article 17 EC, and not in conjunction 
with Article 18(1) EC. The latter provision was not relevant since the rules at 
issue in the case (rules determining surnames) did not affect the claimants’ 
right of residence, and the claimants had not exercised their right to move. 
Furthermore, there are several cases – also pre-citizenship – in which Arti-
cle 12 EC was applied despite the fact that the situation did not appear to fall 
within the material scope of Community law.93 Take for instance the Cowan 
88. Garcia Avello, supra note 29, para 26.
89. Martínez Sala, supra note 21.
90. It is important to stress that in Martínez Sala the situation did not fall within the material 
scope of the Treaty by virtue of Art. 18(1) EC since the Court held that it was not necessary to 
investigate the legal effect of such provision. Similar confusion in relation to the material scope 
of the Treaty can be found in Bidar; however, in that case, as in Grzelcyck the situation fell in 
any case within the material scope of the Treaty by virtue of Art. 18(1) EC. 
91. Similarly circular is the reasoning in the pre-citizenship Case 293/82, Gravier, [1985] 
ECR 593. 
92. Garcia Avello, supra note 29.
93. In other cases, the situation could be more easily brought within the personal and mate-
rial scope of the Treaty because of its indirect effect on intra-Community trade or free movement 
rights; e.g. Case C-92/92, Phil Collins, [1993] ECR I-5145; Case C-360/00, Land Hessen v. G. 
Ricordi & Co. Bühnen- und Musikverlag GmbH, [2002] ECR I-5089; and Case C-28/04, Tod’s 
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case.94 There, the Court held that a British tourist could rely on Article 12 EC 
in relation to a rule which discriminated on grounds of residence and nation-
ality in establishing the eligibility criteria for a crime compensation scheme. 
Or the Spanish museum admissions case,95 where the Court relied on Articles 
49 and 12 EC to find that discriminatory entry conditions fell within the 
prohibition of discrimination provided for in the Treaty; and similarly, Bickel 
and Franz,96 where Article 12 EC applied because the claimants were mi-
grant service recipients. In those cases, whilst it is clear that the situation fell 
within the personal scope of the Treaty, it is open to debate whether the situa-
tion fell within its material scope.
In this respect, consider what was mentioned above in relation to the per-
sonal vis-à-vis the material scope of the economic free movement provisions. 
In relation to those provisions, in order to bring himself or herself within the 
personal scope of application of the Treaty, the Union citizen has to satisfy 
two conditions: cross-border link and economic activity (including the pas-
sive economic link provided by the fact of receiving an economic service). 
In the cases mentioned above, the personal scope of the Treaty had been 
effectively triggered. Mr Cowan, Mr Bickel and Mr Franz, and the tourists 
were in another Member State (cross-border link) to receive services (passive 
economic link).
However, the situations under consideration fell outside the material scope 
of Article 49 EC, a fact demonstrated by the need to rely on Article 12 EC. 
The conditions relating to crime compensation schemes and translation in 
court proceedings do not affect the citizens’ possibility to receive economic 
services; and the museum entry conditions did not fall within the material 
scope of Article 49 EC for lack of remuneration. And yet, in those cases, Ar-
ticle 12 EC applied.
Similarly, consider the ruling in Ferlini,97 where the Court accepted that 
Article 12 EC could be invoked by a worker to whom Article 39(2) EC was 
not applicable. In that case, there was a cross-border situation since Mr Ferli-
ni was a non-national working for one of the EC institutions in Luxembourg. 
Spa et al v. Heyraud SA, [2005] ECR I-5781, on copyright and related rights; Case C-43/95, 
Data Delecta, [1996] ECR I-4661; Case C-323/95, Hayes, [1997] ECR I-1711; Case C-122/96, 
Saldanha, [1997] ECR I-5323 on security costs in judicial proceedings. 
94. Case 186/87, Cowan v. Trésor Public, [1989] ECR 195
95. Case C-45/93, Commission v. Spain (Museum admission), [1994] ECR I-911; see also 
Case C-388/01, Commission v. Italy (Italian museums), [2003] ECR I-721, where however the 
Court applied Art. 49 EC alone; for a critique of the latter ruling see Davies, “’Any place I hang 
my hat?’ or: residence is the new nationality”, 11 (2005) ELJ, 43.
96. Case C-274/96, Bickel and Franz, [1998] ECR I-1121
97. Case C-411/98, A Ferlini v. Centre Hospitalier de Luxembourg, [2000] ECR I-8081.
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However, because of the special arrangements which apply to Communi-
ty employees, the principle of non-discrimination for migrant workers con-
tained in Article 39(2) EC and in Regulation 1612/68 was not applicable.98 
Nonetheless, the Court found that Mr Ferlini could rely on Article 12 EC. As 
said above, two conditions need to be met in order to fall within the personal 
scope of Article 39 EC: that of being a worker (or a work-seeker), and the 
cross-border link; on the other hand, Article 39(2) EC relates to the material 
scope of that provision. Mr Ferlini fell within the personal scope of Article 39 
EC by virtue of being a migrant worker, but he did not fall within the mate-
rial scope of that provision, or else Article 39(2) EC and Regulation 1612/68 
would have applied. Yet, the Court had no problem in applying Article 12 EC. 
 The reason why such cases might seem inconclusive is that, in all of them, 
there was an element of migration. Thus it could be argued that the personal 
scope of the economic free movement provisions is fulfilled by having exer-
cised, or exercising an economic activity; and that the material scope of the 
Treaty is triggered by the exercise of the right to move.99 Viewed in this light, 
the above cases would not indicate anything new: for Article 12 EC to apply, 
the situation must fall within both the personal and the material scope of the 
Treaty. And yet, as was said in section 2 above, if such were true the case law 
of the Court on purely internal situations would be more difficult to justify.100 
In particular, if the personal scope of Article 39 EC were to be triggered by 
the sole fact of being a worker, it is unclear why the rights of non-discrimina-
tion on grounds of nationality contained in Article 39(2) EC, and the rights 
conferred by Article 39(3) EC, undoubtedly constituting the material scope 
of that provision, should be reserved to migrants. 
Thus, it seems that in several cases Article 12 EC applied only by virtue of 
the situation falling within the personal scope of the Treaty. If those cases are 
justified having regard to a teleological interpretation of the Treaty,101 there 
is no reason why the same approach should not be adopted in relation to 
static Union citizens, since they also fall, by virtue of Article 17 EC, within 
the personal scope of the Treaty. It is argued then that the right not to be dis-
98. Art. 7(2) Regulation 1612/68, supra note 5, on freedom of movement for workers within 
the Community. 
99. On the other hand there is evidence to suggest that migration alone is sufficient, at least 
in certain cases, to trigger Art. 12 EC. See e.g. Case C-224/00, Commission v. Italy, (fines for 
road offences), [2002] ECR I-2965; and also Case C-29/95, Pastoors and Trans Cap, [1997] 
ECR I-285. 
100. E.g. Joined Cases C-64 & 65/96, Uecker and Jacquet, [1997] ECR I-3171.
101. And in fact such an interpretation is much preferable to the artificial stance taken in 
Case 59/85, Reed, [1986] ECR 1283, where the Court qualified the right for a worker to have 
his/her partner living with him/her as a social advantage in order to ensure that the right to equal 
treatment in relation to the partner’s residence rights would be upheld. 
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criminated against on grounds of nationality (or movement/residence) should 
apply also to static Union citizens so that, provided the non-migrant is in a 
comparable situation with the migrant, she should have a right to equal treat-
ment. 
 
6.2. What if? The application of Article 12 EC to purely internal
 situations
We have argued above that the Court has already in the past applied Article 
12 EC to situations which, whilst falling within the personal scope of the 
Treaty, did not fall within its material scope; and that this approach should be 
extended to allow static Union citizens to rely on the Treaty when they are in 
a comparable situation with the migrant, and find themselves at a disadvan-
tage only because they have not exercised their right to move. The implica-
tions of this step are not as far-reaching as one might think, since Article 12 
EC would not entail a free-standing right to review of legislation in terms 
of proportionality and fundamental rights; nor would it serve the purpose 
of granting rights beyond those which are conferred upon migrant Union 
citizens. Rather it would become a vehicle to ensure true equality between 
nationals of Member States through Community law, rather than through na-
tional law. 
There are two areas where this interpretation might have a perceptible im-
pact on the rights of individuals: family rights and the right to have one’s own 
personal circumstances taken into account when the Member State is limiting 
the right to equal treatment conferred by Article 12 EC.
In relation to the rights of third country national family members, the stat-
ic citizen would have the same rights as those enjoyed by migrant Union 
citizens. Here, the right to equal treatment would probably determine a lim-
ited change in the substantive situation of the claimant since, often, the right 
of residence of third country spouses and children is recognized by national 
law.102 And yet, the right to equal treatment might be relevant in respect of 
relationships between non-married partners. Here, the migrant does not have 
a right to be accompanied by his/her registered partner in those Member 
States which do not recognize partnership; however, according to Article 3(2) 
Directive 2004/38, Member States are under a duty to “facilitate entry and 
residence” of the “partner with whom Union citizen has a durable relation-
ship, duly attested”. If the right not to be discriminated against on grounds 
102. And the Court has been generous in allowing Union citizens to establish the cross-
border link even in situations which were, for all intent and purposes, purely internal; see e.g. 
Carpenter, supra note 10; and generally Nic Shuibhne, op. cit. supra note 85, 731. 
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of nationality or movement were to apply to static Union citizens, then the 
Member State would bear the same duty towards its own static citizens that it 
bears towards migrant Union citizens. 
Furthermore, and as we shall consider in more detail below, the right to 
equal treatment might be of relevance, in certain instances, in allowing the 
claimant to rely on the general principles of Community law, and in particu-
lar the right to family life and the right to have one’s own personal circum-
stances taken into account. In this respect, consider the factual situation at 
issue in Carpenter where deportation of the spouse was considered by the 
Court to be an undue interference with family life.103 Or the situation at issue 
in R where the Court held that deportation of a divorced third country nation-
al spouse would constitute a disproportionate interference with the children’s 
right to reside in the United Kingdom.104 The right to equal treatment would 
impose on national authorities, where that is not already the case, the duty 
to take into consideration the fundamental rights of the claimant, and to act 
proportionately. It is exactly this right to review which would have the most 
pervasive effect in national constitutional law. In this respect, the reticence of 
the Court, and the resistance of the Member States, is probably not due to the 
fear of creating more substantive rights for own citizens,105 but rather the ef-
fect that extending the scope of the Treaty to purely internal situations would 
have on national procedural rules and on national rules concerning hierarchy 
of norms.106
Here, consider that whenever a situation falls within the scope of Com-
munity law, the general principles are directly applicable, so that a rule which 
conflicts with the principle of equality, proportionality or fundamental rights 
might be set aside by any court seized with the matter. This constitutes a 
significant advantage for the claimant since, even when fundamental rights 
are recognized to the same extent in national law, the direct applicability of 
fundamental rights and proportionality might result in a speedier, less expen-
sive and possibly more effective way of enforcing one’s rights. However, it is 
exactly the availability of the right of “diffuse judicial review” which is prob-
lematic, since it has the effect of bypassing the constitutional arrangements 
put in place by the Member States for the review of legality of legislation, 
103. Carpenter, supra note 10.
104. Baumbast, supra note 26.
105. Although in some instances that might also be the case; cf. the proposed UK protocol to 
the Reform Treaty in relation to the effect of the Charter and the debate about the right to strike 
in Case C-438/05, The International Transport Workers’ Federation and The Finnish Seamen’s 
Union v. Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, Opinion delivered on 23 May 2007, case 
still pending at the time of writing.
106. See section 7 below on the constitutional effects of the Union Citizenship case law. 
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especially in those cases where, as we have seen above, the national rule, or 
its application, does not per se conflict with Community law. To allow non-
migrants to rely on Article 12 EC (albeit in limited circumstances) to achieve 
a degree of fundamental rights protection which is not available according to 
national constitutional law might then be a step too far in the interpretation 
of the Treaty. 
These objections bear considerable weight; however, those are objections 
to the case law of the Court, and not so much to the possible extension of its 
effects to purely internal situations. In other words, either one argues that the 
Court has gone too far in say Baumbast, Bidar, and also Carpenter, or there 
is a challenging argument to be made as to why crossing a border should 
make such a difference to claimants’ rights. Here, take for instance Bidar. 
How could it be maintained that a British national who is in exactly the same 
situation as Mr Bidar, but for the fact that she had been raised in a third coun-
try, should not have a right to a student loan? Why should Mr Carpenter have 
a right to family life, but a less resourceful person who happened not to have 
a remote link with an intra-Community situation (or did not have access to 
good legal advice) should not? 
Another objection to the possibility of allowing static Union citizens to 
rely on the combined effect of Articles 17 and 12 EC is of a more funda-
mental nature. Here, it could be argued that the “complementary nature” of 
Union citizenship, which is not to replace national citizenship, is at odds 
with the possibility of allowing static Union citizens to rely on Article 17 EC 
when the situation does not have a Community/European dimension, espe-
cially given the pervasive constitutional consequences of doing so.107 Seen 
in this light, Union citizenship would simply be a step further in the process 
of European integration. This approach would also be justified by a teleo-
logical interpretation of the Treaty, which is aimed at regulating situations 
with a cross-border dimension. However, the Court has gone far beyond a 
cross-border telos in its interpretation of both the economic free movement 
provisions and the citizenship provisions. Consider for instance cases where 
the existence of a potential recipient / provider in other Member States is suf-
ficient to establish the cross-border element;108 the Baumbast/Bidar approach 
mentioned above, where the balance struck between competing interests by 
the legislature is recognized as legitimate and proportionate in the abstract 
and yet, in practice, it is held hostage by the Court’s own vision of the merits 
of the particular case; and Garcia Avello, where the barrier to movement was 
107. I am extremely grateful to Francesco De Cecco for having raised this objection. 
108. See also Spaventa, op. cit. supra note 83, Ch.7 and supra note 11.
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merely hypothetical, based on the assumption that the claimants might want 
to exercise in future their right to move to Spain.
Thus, whether one likes it or not, there is a perceptible trend in the case 
law of a rights-driven jurisprudence, rather than just an integrationist driven 
one. And once we accept, if indeed we do accept, that such rights-driven 
approach is legitimate, then such an approach must necessarily drive the in-
terpretation of the citizenship provisions as a whole, so as to have a legally 
coherent system. Or else, the impression one might get is that of a Union 
where decisions as to the rights of individuals are left to random choices 
rather than persuasive hermeneutic arguments.
 
7. The constitutionalizing effect of Union citizenship: Introducing
 flexibility in national law 
So far we have analysed the way Union citizenship has affected (or should 
affect) the scope of the Treaty; it is now time to consider its constitutional 
implications on domestic systems.
We have mentioned above that the Court has held that any limitation to the 
right to move and reside granted by Article 18(1) EC, or of the right to equal 
treatment granted by Article 12 EC, must comply with the general principles 
of Community law, and in particular with the principle of proportionality and 
fundamental rights as general principles of Community law. At first glance, 
the requirement to comply with the general principles of Community law is a 
natural, and consistent, consequence of the direct effect of Article 18(1) EC. 
In this respect, consider that the Court has long held that any limitation to a 
right conferred directly by the Treaty must comply with the general principles 
of Community law.109 However, the case law on Union citizenship seems to 
have more far-reaching constitutional effects. Here, it is necessary to distin-
guish between the case law on the restrictions imposed by the Member State 
of origin (e.g. D’Hoop, Tas-Hagen etc.) and the restrictions imposed by the 
host Member State (e.g. Baumbast, Bidar and maybe Avello).
Thus, in relation to the former, the reasoning of the Court so far mirrors 
its reasoning in relation to barriers to the economic free movement rights: the 
legislation must pursue an aim legitimate with Community law; and the way 
109. E.g. Case C-55/94, Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di 
Milano, [1995] ECR I-4165, para 37; and for the need to comply with fundamental rights, see 
e.g. Case C-260/89, Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi AE (ERT) v. Dimotiki Étairia Pliroforissis 
(DEP), [1991] ECR I-2925; and Case C-368/95, Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- und 
vertriebs GmbH v. Heinrich Bauer Verlag, [1997] ECR I-3689. 
40  Spaventa CML Rev. 2008
in which it does so must be the least restrictive means available (or a propor-
tionate way of achieving that aim).110 In this respect, the rules are assessed in 
the abstract, so that they are either compatible with Community law in rela-
tion to all migrant citizens; or they are inconsistent with the requirements of 
Community law and they must be amended in relation to all migrants. Here, 
the effect of the case law is simply to grant a directly effective right to move 
to those who could previously rely on the Treaty only insofar as they could 
argue that they were service recipients wishing to go to another Member 
State.
However, in relation to some of the rules imposed by the host State, the 
assessment of proportionality is considerably more pervasive. Thus, the na-
tional authorities must take into due consideration the personal situation of 
the claimant so that even when the rule in the abstract is compatible with 
Community law, its application to that particular claimant might be contrary 
to the requirements of proportionality or fundamental rights protection. Here, 
consider that the national rules at issue in Baumbast or Bidar implemented 
correctly secondary legislation; and the said secondary legislation was itself 
compatible with the Treaty. The cases did not concern the exercise of discre-
tion by the Member State, since the conditions of sufficient resources and 
comprehensive health insurance were prescribed and defined by Directive 
90/364. And yet, the effect of Article 18(1) EC was to impose a proportion-
ality assessment of otherwise legitimate requirements. This resulted in an 
obligation for the authorities to take into account the personal circumstances 
of the claimants, and led to the need to disapply the relevant provisions of na-
tional law in relation to those claimants. It is this “personalized” assessment 
of proportionality which brings about a qualitative change in the expansion 
of judicial review of national rules. 
This qualitative change is of constitutional relevance both in relation to 
the Community’s own system, and in relation to the domestic constitutional 
systems. In relation to the Community system, Dougan has remarked that 
the novelty of this approach is to extend the review of proportionality beyond 
the accepted categories of “derogations from harmonized norms, the confer-
ral of administrative discretion, or the exercise of ancillary powers, so as to 
cover also the merely mechanical implementation of the relevant Community 
110. Although Hendrix, supra note 4, might be signalling a shift in the Court’s approach 
towards home State barriers, insofar as that case could be read as introducing a Baumbast sort 
of reasoning also in these cases. However, the case is not conclusive since the Dutch legislation 
at issue left some discretion to the relevant authorities and it could therefore be argued that the 
obligation to take into account the personal circumstances of the claimant arose as a result of 
that discretion. 
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secondary legislation.”111 By requiring such “indirect review” of Community 
legislation, the Court is curtailing the discretion of the legislature since even 
when legitimate Community secondary legislation would authorize (and re-
quire) a certain course of action, such course of action needs to be assessed 
in its proportionality. This means that it is no longer open to the Community 
legislature to exclude altogether a certain benefit or a certain category of 
claimants from the scope of the Treaty. 
In relation to domestic constitutional systems, this case law has even more 
pervasive effects. Here, in order to fully appreciate the implications of the 
Baumbast ruling it is necessary to recall in general lines traditional systems 
of judicial review.112 Broadly speaking, judicial review is a function of hierar-
chy of norms.113 We can distinguish two radically different forms of review: 
that which takes place in relation to executive acts; and that which takes place 
in relation to legislative acts. In relation to executive / administrative acts 
which have effects on a given individual, or group of individuals, i.e. in rela-
tion to those acts which are not of general application, the power of review, 
whether reserved to specialized administrative courts or tribunals, or left to 
ordinary courts, is more pervasive, being aimed at guaranteeing the proper 
exercise of power and discretion by public authorities. In this respect, the per-
sonal situation of the claimant is usually taken into account by the judiciary. 
Judicial review exercised in relation to legislative acts, or acts of general 
application, however is radically different: the act is measured against the 
constitutional yardstick; the balance between competing interests is assessed 
in a more abstract way; and a broader discretion is left to the legislature, 
since it is recognized that, within the limits set by the constitutional system, 
such balance is the expression of policy choices which pertains to the legis-
lature.114 Furthermore, given the seriousness of the effects of a declaration of 
nullity, which is valid erga omnes,115 access to such review is usually more 
limited, and the assessment of constitutionality is reserved to one or more 
higher courts.116 The centralized approach to constitutional review is aimed 
111. Dougan, op. cit. supra note 15, at 626.
112. For an excellent comparative overview see Cappelletti, “The ‘Mighty Problem’ of Judi-
cial Review and the Contribution of Comparative Analysis” 6 LIEI (1979/2), 1.
113. This is the case even when the legality of a piece of legislation is assessed in relation to 
unwritten principles, such as presumptions of intention in the UK constitutional context.
114. The difference between administrative and constitutional review is also present in the 
Community system, and so is the extent to which the Court is willing to interfere with the broad 
margin of discretion left to the legislature; e.g. Case 331/88, Fedesa, [1990] ECR I-4023. 
115. This is the case even when the effect of such nullity can be tamed as to its temporal 
application. 
116. The situation is of course different in the United Kingdom where there is no written 
Constitution and Acts of Parliament cannot be declared “unlawful” by any court, although fol-
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at guaranteeing a number of interests, such as the uniformity and certainty of 
the law; the possibility for the legislature to intervene in defending its legal-
ity; as well as the need to reserve the decision on complex legal (and politi-
cal) issues to experienced judges. 
This traditional constitutional arrangement, which reflects given (if dif-
ferent) notions of the separation, and the respective strength, of the different 
powers of the State, is strained, if not together challenged, by the “proportion-
ality” cases. The expansion of the personal and material scope of the Treaty, 
together with the ad hoc proportionality assessment required by the Court in 
(almost) any circumstance concerning the migrant, transforms the legislative 
act of general application, into a quasi administrative act where the authori-
ties always have to exercise discretion in applying the black letter of the law 
to Union citizens. As a result, the application of a piece of domestic legisla-
tion might be incompatible with Community law in the case at issue,117 and 
yet be compatible with Community law in a situation where the circumstanc-
es are different. Mr Baumbast might have gained a right to reside due to his 
length of stay and his family circumstances, and yet a Ms Kesselring having 
her health insurance in Germany and no emergency cover would find it more 
difficult to establish a right of residence if she had no prior connection with 
the UK. Mr Bidar might have the right to a university loan to pursue his edu-
cation in the United Kingdom, and yet a Ms Esposito who went to the United 
Kingdom solely to pursue her secondary education at a private school, and 
whose family resided in Italy, might find the Court less keen in imposing 
upon the British tax payer the burden of financing her student’s loan. 
It is therefore the need to take into account the personal circumstances of 
the claimant that entails a qualitative change in the type of judicial review of 
national legislation required by Community law. In this respect, the Baum-
bast line of case law can be usefully juxtaposed to the traditional approach 
adopted by the Court in relation to the scrutiny of proportionality of rules im-
posing barriers to movement. There, a piece of legislation which is found to 
be incompatible with Community law is incompatible with Community law 
in relation to all migrant economic operators.118 Thus, if a rule is found to 
be a barrier to market access in the context, say, of the freedom of establish-
ment, such rule is a barrier for all economic operators wishing to penetrate 
lowing the Human Rights Act courts can issue a declaration of incompatibility between the Act 
of Parliament and the ECHR.
117. Cf. e.g. operative part of the ruling in Baumbast, supra note 26; in Bidar, supra note 
69; also Carpenter, supra note 10.
118. E.g. recently Case C-442/02, Caixa-Bank, [2004] ECR I-8961; Case C-79/01, Payroll 
Data Services (Italy) et al., [2002] ECR I-8923.
Citizenship 43
that market.119 On the other hand, whether the denial of a right to residence 
for lack of resources and comprehensive health insurance is compatible with 
Community law will depend solely on the facts of the case and on the per-
sonal circumstances of the claimant: consider in this respect the difference 
between the facts of Baumbast (integrated member of the host-community, 
with an established and prolonged link with the host State, with family, and 
representing a small financial risk for the United Kingdom), and Trojani (not 
as integrated, with no family, and representing a considerable financial risk 
for the host State).120 Whilst it is true that Community law does not formally 
affect domestic constitutional arrangements, in that it does not require or em-
power the national judiciary to declare the nullity of domestic legislation, it 
empowers, and requires, any judge to set aside domestic law when its appli-
cation would be disproportionate having regard to the personal circumstances 
of the claimant. It is this power of “diffuse judicial review” of the application 
of legislative acts, even if limited, that constitutes the greatest constitutional 
effect of the introduction of Union citizenship. 
Finally, it should be noted that the effect in the domestic constitutional 
system of this case law is different in nature from that described above in 
relation to the constitutional effects in Community law. Here, it has been 
remarked that the citizenship case law has the effect of curtailing the extent 
to which the Community legislature can in practice decide the limits of the 
rights conferred by the Treaty. However, the effect of Union citizenship is 
not to impose upon national (or Community) authorities a scrutiny of the 
proportionality of Community legislation.121 An example might be of use in 
illustrating the difference. Take for instance the case in which the free move-
ment of goods is limited by means of Community secondary legislation, say 
to react to the spreading of a pernicious or dangerous disease amongst farm 
119. Caixa-Bank, previous footnote; Payroll Data Services, previous footnote.
120. This step towards the “administrativization” of the enforcement of national law, where-
by the authorities find themselves under a Community law duty to consider the case in its nu-
ances even when it fits the black letter of the law, is not an isolated phenomenon and in certain 
respects is also visible in the health care cases, where the Court imposed upon the national 
authorities substantive duties to review the denial of reimbursement for health care received 
abroad even though such a refusal was consistent with the provisions of Regulation 1408/71; see 
especially Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, [2001] ECR I-5473; Case C-385/99, 
Müller Fauré and van Riet, [2003] ECR I-4509. Further, a similar approach has been adopted in 
Carpenter, supra note 10; however I am inclined to consider Carpenter as a citizenship case; see 
Spaventa, “From Gebhard to Carpenter: towards a (non-)Economic European Constitution”, 41 
CML Rev. (2004), 743; and id. op. cit. supra note 83, Ch. 6
121. On this point see also the discussion in Dougan, op. cit. supra note 15, who seems to 
advocate an alignment between the Baumbast approach and the case law on secondary legisla-
tion. 
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animals. The national authorities would be under a Community law obliga-
tion to take the necessary action to implement these measures, and if there 
is no discretion left to the national authorities, the application of Community 
law would be more or less automatic. In this case however, there would be no 
possibility for an individual to claim “special treatment” before the national 
authorities. Here, the Community legislation would either be proportionate 
or disproportionate;122 there is no evidence to support the possibility of the 
Court allowing for Community law to be disapplied because of the claimant’s 
individual circumstances.123
8. Conclusions 
There cannot be any doubt that the introduction of Union citizenship has had 
far-reaching effects, and that it has considerably broadened both the personal 
and the material scope of the Treaty. Any Union citizen falls now within the 
personal scope of the Treaty, regardless of an economic or cross border link. 
And, the rights of movement and residence conferred by Article 18(1) EC 
have been interpreted broadly so that Union citizens can challenge both the 
rules of the Member State of origin, when those affect in any way the right to 
move and/or reside in another Member State; and the rules of the host Mem-
ber State, when they limit movement, residence or discriminate on grounds of 
nationality. Furthermore, it has been argued that the right not to be discrimi-
nated against on grounds of nationality conferred by Article 12 EC should 
be considered as one of the rights granted by the Treaty to Union citizens, 
so that static Union citizens who find themselves in a comparable situation 
to migrant Union citizens would have a right to equal treatment deriving 
directly from Community law. Such an interpretation would be consistent 
both with the existing case law on Article 12 EC, and with the demands of a 
meaningful concept of citizenship. 
The very idea of citizenship sits uncomfortably with an a priori differ-
entiation between citizens based on the sole ground that a border has been 
crossed. This is all the more the case given that the Court, in its case law, has 
adopted a constitutional interpretation, rather than a mere integrationist one. 
Thus, the Baumbast line of cases, with its stress on an ad hoc proportionality 
assessment, reshapes the duties that national authorities, as well as nation-
al courts, bear towards Union citizens. This has wide-ranging constitutional 
effects, empowering the individual and rendering judicial protection more 
122. Cf. e.g. Case C-189/01, Jippes and others, [2001] ECR I-5689. 
123. See also Hendrix, supra note 4. 
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effective. Whilst such an approach might be problematic since it subverts tra-
ditional centralized systems of judicial review, it would nevertheless be arbi-
trary to confine its effects to those who are either sufficiently resourceful – or 
sufficiently well advised – so as to be able to establish a cross-border link. In 
a Union built on the principle of equality, there should be no space for an Or-
wellian approach whereby some citizens are more equal than others.
